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Abstract Over the past forty-ﬁve years, bilateral investment treaties ~BITs! have
become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and
governance of foreign direct investment+ The proliferation of BITs during the past
two decades in particular has been phenomenal+ These intergovernmental treaties typ-
ically grant extensive rights to foreign investors, including protection of contractual
rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute+
How can we explain the widespread adoption of BITs? We argue that the spread of
BITs is driven by international competition among potential host countries—typically
developing countries—for foreign direct investment+ We propose a set of hypotheses
that derive from such an explanation and develop a set of empirical tests that rely on
network measures of economic competition as well as more indirect evidence of com-
petitive pressures on the host to sign BITs+ The evidence suggests that potential hosts
are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so+ We ﬁnd some
evidence that coercion and learning play a role, but less support for cultural expla-
nations based on emulation+ Our main ﬁnding is that the diffusion of BITs is associ-
ated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a
share of foreign investment+ We are agnostic at this point about the beneﬁts of this
competition for development+
The global market for productive capital is more integrated than ever before+ The
growth of foreign direct investment ~FDI! is a clear example+ According to World
Bank data, gross FDI as a percentage of total world production increased seven-
fold from 1+2 percent to 8+9 percent between 1970 and 2000+ Though such invest-
ments tend to be highly skewed across jurisdictions—developed countries account
For useful comments on earlier drafts of this article, we thank Bill Bernhard, Bear Braumoeller,
Frank Dobbin, Robert Franzese, Jeffry Frieden, Geoffrey Garrett, Tom Ginsburg, Jude Hays, Lisa Mar-
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© 2006 by The IO Foundation+ DOI: 10+10170S0020818306060279for more than 93 percent of outﬂows and 68 percent of inﬂows1—foreign capital
has come to play a much more visible role in many more countries worldwide+
It is widely recognized that economic globalization requires market-supporting
institutions to ﬂourish+ But unlike trade and monetary relations, virtually no multi-
lateral rules for FDI exist+2 Direct investments in developing countries are over-
whelmingly governed by bilateral investment treaties ~BITs!+ BITs are agreements
establishing the terms and conditions for private investment by nationals and com-
panies of one country in the jurisdiction of another+ Virtually all BITs cover four
substantive areas: FDI admission, treatment, expropriation, and the settlement of
disputes+ These bilateral arrangements have proliferated over the past forty-ﬁve
years, and especially in the past two decades, even as political controversies have
plagued efforts to establish a multilateral regime for FDI+
Why the profusion of bilateral agreements? The popularity of BITs contrasts
sharply with the collective resistance developing countries have shown toward pro-
investment principles under customary international law and the failure of the inter-
national community to make progress on a multilateral investment agreement+3
On its face, this seems to suggest that BITs do not simply reﬂect the ready accep-
tance of dominant international property rights norms+ Our theory and ﬁndings
support the competitive economic explanations described in the introduction to
this symposium:4 the proliferation of BITs—and the liberal property rights regime
they embody—is propelled in good part by the competition among potential host
countries for credible property rights protections that direct investors require+
The article is organized as follows+ The ﬁrst section describes the spread of
BITs in some detail+ The second section presents a model of competition for invest-
ment that could lead to diffusion among competitors+ The third section discusses
the methods we use to test our propositions ~and a range of alternatives!, and the
fourth section discusses our ﬁndings+ Our data are consistent with competitive pres-
sures for BIT proliferation: governments are inﬂuenced by competitors’ policies
and by the mobility of FDI in manufactures, which tends to intensify competition
among hosts+ We interpret our ﬁndings as evidence of pressure for certain govern-
ments to adopt capital-friendly policies in highly competitive global capital markets+
Securing Investors’ Legal Rights
From Customary Law to Bilateral Investment Treaties
FDI has always been subject to contractual and political hazards that raise the
expected costs of investing+5 Before the use of BITs, few mechanisms existed to
1+ UNCTAD+ FDI0TNC Database+ Available at ^http:00www+unctad+org&+ Accessed 20 June 2006+
2+ For a review of the relevant legal literature, see Dolzer 1981; Minor 1994; Sornarajah 1994; and
Vagts 1987+
3+ Guzman 1998+
4+ Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, this volume+
5+ Henisz 2000+
812 International Organizationmake state promises about the treatment of foreign investment credible+6 Custom-
ary international law, expressed succinctly in the “Hull Rule,” held that “no gov-
ernment is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without
provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore+”7 Apart from the
obvious problem of enforcement, this approach did not allow potential hosts to
voluntarily signal their intent to contract in good faith+
Both customary international law and its practice were under attack by developing
country hosts by the 1950s+ The nationalization of British oil assets by Iran in 1951,
the expropriation of Liamco’s concessions in Libya in 1955, and the nationaliza-
tion of the Suez Canal by Egypt a year later served notice of a new militancy on the
part of investment hosts+ The nationalization of sugar interests by Cuba in the 1960s
further undercut assumptions about the security of international investments+8 Mean-
while, collective resistance to the Hull Rule in the United Nations was on the rise+
In 1962, the UN General Assembly adopted the “Resolution on Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources” that provided for merely “appropriate” compensa-
tion in the event of expropriation+ Several more UN resolutions followed in the
1970s,9 along with a string of undercompensated expropriations around the world+10
Bilateral treaties made their debut in the late 1950s, just as consensus on cus-
tomary rules began to erode+ BITs were innovative in a number of respects+11 They
6+ For a discussion of the historical protection of foreign investment, see Lipson 1985+
7+ See Cordell Hull’s note to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs during a 1938 dispute over
land expropriations, reprinted in Green H+ Hackworth, Digest of International Law v+ 3, § 228 ~1942!+
The Rule itself predates Cordell Hull’s statement, and various statements of it can be found in deci-
sions from the early part of the twentieth century+ See Concerning the Factory at Chorzow ~Ger+ v+
Pol+!, 1926–29 P+C+I+L+ ~ser+ A!, Nos+ 7, 9, 17, 19; and Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration
~U+S+ v+ Nor+! 1 Rep+ Int’l Arb+ Awards 307 ~1922!+
8+ Guzman 1998+
9+ These are discussed in Lipson 1985+ In 1966 the General Assembly reafﬁrmed states’ rights to
nationalize resources without reference to international legal principles+ In 1972, the UN GeneralAssem-
bly passed Resolution 3041 ~XXVII!, which contained an endorsement of the Trade and Development
Board’s resolution 88 ~XII! of 19 October 1972, regarding permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
and claimed that compensation for natural resource nationalization cases was to be ﬁxed by the nation-
alizing state, with jurisdiction for such cases falling within the sole jurisdiction of the nationalizing
country’s courts+ The 1973 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources ~Resolution
3171! stated that in the event of nationalization “each State is entitled to determine the amount of
possible compensation and the mode of payment+” The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States @GA Res+ 3281~xxix!, UN GAOR, 29th Sess+, Supp+ No+ 31, 50# speciﬁed the right of each
state “To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate
compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent,” with national courts
taking jurisdiction in case of disputes @Art+ 2~c!#+
10+ See Kobrin 1980+
11+ Other mechanisms have been used to try to protect foreign investment, of course+ One possibil-
ity since 1988 is to apply for insurance through the World Bank’s Multilateral Insurance Guarantee
Agency ~MIGA!+ MIGA covers risks associated with transfer restriction, expropriation, breach of con-
tract, and risks relating to war and civil disturbances+ See ^http:00www+miga+org0&+ Accessed 20 June
2006+ U+S+ businesses can also insure against risks associated with currency inconvertibility, expropri-
ation, and political violence by applying for investment insurance from the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation ~OPIC!, aU +S+ government agency+ See ^http:00www+opic+gov0Insurance0&+ Accessed
20 June 2006+
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 813require an explicit commitment on the part of the potential host government and
involve direct negotiations with the government of potential investors+ In this way,
BITs up the political ante for the host government and raise expectations of per-
formance+ The typical BIT offers a wider array of substantive protections than did
the customary rule+ For example, BITs typically require national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment of foreign investments in the host country,12 pro-
tect contractual rights,13 guarantee the right to transfer proﬁts in hard currency to
the home country, and prohibit or restrict the use of performance requirements+14
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, BITs provide for international arbitration
of disputes between the investor and the host country,15 typically through the Inter-
national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes ~ICSID! or the UN Com-
mission on International Trade Law ~UNCITRAL!+
The Spread of BITs
Despite the aggressive campaign waged by some developing countries against the
relevant customary international law, BITs were embraced by many potential host
governments+16 Figure 1 documents the geometric growth of both investment trea-
ties and mean inﬂows of FDI as a percentage of GDP from 1960 to 2000+ Early
BITs typically involved a midsized European power and one of the least devel-
oped countries, often in Africa ~see Table 1!+ The negotiation of BITs proceeded
at a moderate pace until the mid-1980s, rarely exceeding twenty new treaties per
year+ Late in the decade, however, the rate of signings accelerated dramatically,
with an average of more than one hundred new treaties a year throughout the 1990s+
The United States embraced BITs later than did its West European counterparts+
Between 1962 and 1972, during which time West Germany entered into forty-six
BITs and Switzerland entered into twenty-seven, the United States eschewed such
treaties and signed only two Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaties—with
Togo and Thailand+17 One reason for the delayed U+S+ participation in bilateral
arrangements may have been the hope of retaining a multilateral approach+ The
United States was one of the most aggressive proponents of the Hull Rule and
12+ For example, the 1994 U+S+ Prototype Bilateral Investment Treaty, Ofﬁce of the Chief Counsel
for International Commerce, U+S+ Department of Commerce; Article 2~1!, 2~2!~a!+ For convenience,
throughout this article we label the more developed partner in a BIT the “home” country ~meaning the
home of investors! and the less-developed partner the “host+” The treaty obligations bind both parties,
but in the vast majority of treaties there is a developed country that will be the source of most FDI and
a developing country that will be the recipient+
13+ For example, 1994 U+S+ Prototype BIT, Article I~d!~ii!+
14+ For example, ibid+, Article V~1-2!+
15+ For example, ibid+, Article IX+
16+ It is interesting to note, however, that some of the most vociferous opponents of the Hull Rule
were in fact latecomers to the BITs movement+ As of the late 1990s, Mexico for example had signed
only two BITs, with Spain and Switzerland+ Brazil did not sign a BIT until 1994, and as of the late
1990s none of its 10 bilateral agreements had entered into force+ India’s pattern is similar to that of
Brazil+ See ^http:00www+worldbank+org0icsid0treaties0treaties+htm&+ Accessed 10 December 2003+
17+ Vandevelde 1988+
814 International Organizationmay have feared that BITs represented a threat to its claim that investment was
already protected under customary international law+ Moreover, potential hosts may
have had incentives to resist the relatively onerous provisions the U+S+ govern-
ment typically tried to secure+ One of the prime differences between the terms
typically offered by the Europeans and the United States at this time was the
former’s emphasis on investment protection and the latter’s additional insistence
on liberalization+18
It was not until 1981 that the United States changed its view on BITs+ There is
evidence that some ofﬁcials in the administration of U+S+ President Ronald Reagan
viewed BITs as an alternative way to protect the principles contained in the embat-
tled Hull Rule+ Secretary of State George Schultz argued that BITs were designed
“to protect investment not only by treaty but also by reinforcing traditional inter-
national legal principles and practice regarding foreign direct private invest-
18+ “Multilateral or Bilateral Investment Negotiations: Where Can Developing Countries Make Them-
selves Heard” Brieﬁng Paper No+ 9+ Available at ^http:00cuts-international+org09-2002+pdf&+ Accessed
12 July 2006+ Some observers note that the insistence on liberalization explains the inability of the
United States to secure agreements with East and Southeast Asian countries until quite recent years;
see Reading 1992+
FIGURE 1. Number of bilateral investment treaties signed and mean global
foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP, by year, 1959–99
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 815ment+”19 By the mid-1980s, the United States pursued investor protection in the
same fashion as did the Europeans+ Schultz noted in his communication with the
19+ George P+ Schultz, transmission letter to the president recommending transmission of the U+S+-
Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty, 1985+ Available at ^http:00www+state+gov0documents0organization0
43615+pdf&+ Accessed 12 July 2006+
TABLE 1. The ﬁrst forty bilateral investment
treaties signed
Investing country Host country Year BIT signed
Germany Dominican Republic 1959
Germany Pakistan 1959
Germany Malaysia 1960
Germany Greece 1961
Switzerland Tunisia 1961
Germany Togo 1961
Germany Thailand 1961
Germany Liberia 1961
Germany Morocco 1961
Switzerland Niger 1962
Switzerland Cote d’Ivoire 1962
Switzerland Guinea 1962
Germany Cameroon 1962
Switzerland Congo 1962
Switzerland Senegal 1962
Germany Guinea 1962
Germany Turkey 1962
Germany Madagascar 1962
Switzerland Rwanda 1963
Netherlands Tunisia 1963
Switzerland Liberia 1963
Switzerland Cameroon 1963
Germany Sri Lanka 1963
Germany Tunisia 1963
Germany Sudan 1963
Italy Guinea 1964
Switzerland Togo 1964
Germany Senegal 1964
Germany Niger 1964
Switzerland Madagascar 1964
Belgium-Luxembourg Tunisia 1964
Germany Korea 1964
Switzerland Tanzania 1965
Switzerland Malta 1965
Germany Sierra Leone 1965
Switzerland Costa Rica 1965
Germany Ecuador 1965
Netherlands Cameroon 1965
Netherlands Cote d’Ivoire 1965
Sweden Cote d’Ivoire 1965
816 International Organizationpresident after completion of six BITs in 198620 that, “@o#ur BIT approach fol-
lowed similar programs that had been undertaken with considerable success by a
number of European countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United Kingdom, since the early 1960s+”21 By the late 1980s, most analysts would
agree that governments in countries home to large multinational corporations
~MNCs! had nearly converged on a single treaty model+ Developing countries could,
increasingly, opt to take it or to leave it+ As Figure 1 attests, many did the former+
Early on, BITs were primarily agreements between countries of starkly varying
developmental levels and political traditions+ Figure 2, which plots the mean dif-
ference in gross domestic product ~GDP! per capita between BIT partners as well
as that between states in all other dyads “at risk” of signing in a given year, dem-
onstrates that the economic differences within these dyads have declined fairly
substantially over time, even while the wealth disparities between non-BIT dyads
have increased+ As is the case with wealth, the “political gap” between new BIT
signers has also diminished signiﬁcantly over the past thirty years+ Figure 3 plots
the mean difference in the level of democracy ~as measured by Polity scores! of
20+ Turkey, Morocco, Haiti, Panama, Senegal, and Zaire+
21+ George P+ Schultz, transmission letter to the president recommending transmission of the
U+S+-Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty, 1985+ Available at ^http:00www+state+gov0documents0
organization043615+pdf&+ Accessed 12 July 2006+
FIGURE 2. Mean difference in GDP per capita between dyad members
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 817BIT partners in the year of their signing against that of all other dyads at risk of
signing+ Over time, new BIT partners have become more similar, evidence that
the institution is spreading to a population of dyads of similar political and eco-
nomic structure and, presumably, with less reason to sign such agreements+
By the late 1990s, there emerged a few twists to the basic theme of wealthy
countries picking off potentially lucrative but risky venues one at a time+ From
about 1999, developing countries began a rather more proactive effort to create
bilateral investment treaties among themselves+ These activities have been coordi-
nated through the UN Conference on Trade and Development ~UNCTAD!, and
sometimes with the assistance of a major capital exporting country, such as Ger-
many or France+ During a meeting jointly sponsored by UNCTAD, the Swiss gov-
ernment, and a group of ﬁfteen developing countries ~G-15!, seven developing
countries signed eight bilateral treaties among themselves+22 Individual develop-
ing countries soon began to seize the initiative+ At the request of Thailand, a mini-
lateral conference yielded seven more developing country BITs,23 and furthered
discussions on several more+ Bolivia ~2000!, India ~2001!, and Croatia ~2001!
initiated minilateral discussions on a similar model+ France ﬁnanced a round of
22+ Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe+
23+ Thailand-Zimbabwe, Thailand-Croatia, Thailand-Iran, Zimbabwe-Croatia, Zimbabwe-Sri Lanka,
Croatia-Iran, Thailand-Kazakhstan, Zimbabwe-Kazakhstan, and Croatia-Kazakhstan+ Sweden also par-
ticipated and concluded a BIT with Thailand+
FIGURE 3. Mean difference in democracy between dyad members
818 International Organizationdiscussions primarily among the Francophone countries in 2001 that attracted twenty
participants and yielded forty-two BITs, many of which involved noncontiguous,
poor, highly indebted African countries for which it is difﬁcult to imagine much
beneﬁt+ ~What are the chances that capital from Burkina Faso would ﬂow to Chad,
or investors from Benin would soon demand entrée to Mali?! More understand-
able, from an economic point of view, was the German-funded and supported meet-
ing in October 2001 that drew together seven capital-poor countries ~ﬁve of which
were ofﬁcially “highly indebted poor countries”! and four wealthy European coun-
tries,24 yielding both understandable ~Belgium-Cambodia! and bizarre ~Sudan-
Zambia! bilateral treaty combinations+25 This recent turn toward BITs between
developing states is more difﬁcult for our theory to explain+ It does seem to sug-
gest that more political or sociological explanations may be increasingly relevant
quite recently in some regions+ However, these cases are still relatively few and
of such recent vintage that they do not affect the broader relationships we report
below+
Leaders and Followers in BIT Agreements
BITs present potential beneﬁts for both capital-exporting and capital-importing
countries+ But which group of countries initiates and drives the signing of such
agreements? Our theory, to anticipate the following section, assumes that poten-
tial host countries have an important ~although not exclusive! role in initiating
or nurturing BIT negotiations+ Is this a plausible assumption? After all, power-
based theories—or “coercive” theories in the language of Simmons, Dobbin, and
Garrett26—suggest that dominant capital-exporting countries such as Germany or
the United States control the agenda and begin BIT negotiations according to their
schedule and needs+ Indeed, the chronology described above suggests that some
home countries establish BIT “programs” and sign agreements with a slate of devel-
oping countries in concentrated periods of time+
If the dominant powers determine the BIT schedule, then we should see evi-
dence of home country “programs” when we look at BITs, by country, across time+
Programs would look like clusters, or peaks, of activity in certain eras in a home
country’s history+ By the same logic, if host countries take a lead role in produc-
ing BITs, their histories would also show some evidence of concerted, program-
matic activity+ Figure 4 and Figure 5 chart the number of BITs signed since 1959
for the twelve most active BIT signatories from both home ~Figure 4! and host
~Figure 5! countries+ It appears that most home countries have BIT activity that
24+ Participants included Cambodia, Eritrea, Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia+
Upon the request of these countries, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden were both invited
to participate and responded afﬁrmatively+
25+ Notice that even multilateral meetings of this sort have not yielded multilateral treaties on invest-
ment+ The states involved have always chosen instead to sign a series of BITs+ The question of why
multilateral approaches are not adopted is interesting, but we leave it for another day+
26+ Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, this volume+
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1lasts at least twenty years; most of these countries, in fact, sign BITs throughout
the forty-year period+ Spain is an exception, with a short spate of BITs in the
1990s only+ Potential hosts, however, demonstrate a different pattern: their BIT
signings spike up in a more clustered pattern, one indicative of programmatic activ-
ity ~see Figure 5!+27
Evidence of programmatic activity can be established statistically as well+ Com-
paring the average kurtosis28 for the historical distribution of BITs among both
home and host countries, it is clear that the distribution of BITs over the past forty
years is signiﬁcantly more peaked ~less uniform! for the host than it is for home
countries ~9+11 and 4+48, respectively!+ The standard deviation of their distribu-
tions over time is also lower for host countries than it is for home ~7+08 versus
9+39, respectively!, suggesting a more clustered pattern of activity for the host+ If
BITs are driven by home country programs, it is not especially apparent in the
data+ Rather, it appears that potential hosts are more likely to sign in clusters—
suggesting that while the major capital exporters stand ready with model treaties
in hand, the decision whether and when to sign is left to a large extent to the host+
The notion that home countries make take-it-or-leave-it offers to potential hosts
and that hosts eventually decide to sign BITs is also consistent with the observed
content of BITs+ These treaties tend to provide consistent terms, even across dif-
ferent home countries+ In particular, the core terms of the treaties are almost always
present: mandatory dispute resolution before an international arbitration body, a
private right of action for investors, monetary compensation in the event of a vio-
lation, national treatment, and most-favored-nation treatment+ This uniformity sug-
gests that host countries are “price-takers” with respect to the terms of these treaties,
consistent with our assumptions+ In essence, each home country has market power
over the terms that will govern investment by its locals+ Host countries, on the
other hand, realize that they must compete with other potential hosts and, there-
fore, cannot demand changes to the core provisions of the treaties+
A Competitive Theory of BIT Diffusion
Our theory of BIT diffusion29 has a simple structure+ BITs are viewed by host
governments and by investors as devices that raise the expected return on invest-
ments+ The treaties do this by assisting governments in making credible commit-
ments to treat foreign investors “fairly”—as described in the previous section+ BITs
27+ Appendixes 1 and 2, available online at ^https:00netﬁles+uiuc+edu0zelkins0www&, also orga-
nized by capital-exporting and -importing countries, summarize the BIT history for all 178 countries
that have ever signed a BIT+
28+ Kurtosis is the degree to which a distribution is peaked, or clustered, with high kurtosis indi-
cating clustered data, and low kurtosis indicating a more uniform distribution+
29+ See Elkins and Simmons 2005, for a further elaboration of the concept of “diffusion+”
822 International Organizationgive host governments a competitive edge in attracting capital30 if there are other-
wise doubts about their willingness to enforce contracts fairly+ Accordingly, gov-
ernments with little inherent credibility are more likely to sign BITs than are
governments known for their fair treatment of foreign capital+ The result is a com-
petitive dynamic among potential hosts to reduce the risks and enhance the prof-
itability of investing+
BITs as a Credible Commitment
Governments may have many motives to sign a BIT, but the most signiﬁcant is to
make a credible commitment to treat foreign investors fairly+ BITs allow govern-
ments to make credible commitments because they raise the ex post costs of non-
compliance above those that might be incurred in the absence of the treaty+ They
do this by ~1! clarifying the commitment, ~2! explicitly involving the home country’s
government, and ~3! enhancing enforcement+31
BITs raise ex post costs of reneging on contracts by reducing the ambiguity of
the host government’s obligations+ BITs are much more precise than customary
international law in this area+ They also provide a broader legal framework in which
to interpret speciﬁc contractual obligations+ Precision removes potential avenues
of plausible deniability, making it clearer to a broader range of audiences ~domes-
tic audiences, other foreign investors, other governments!, that an obligation has
been disregarded+ Clear violations imply a much greater reputational cost than do
actions not clearly barred by law+32
The second way BITs raise ex post costs of reneging is by involving the investor’s
government as a treaty party+ BITs are negotiated between sovereign states+ State-
to-state legal arrangements implicate the interests of the home government more
directly than do simple investment contracts between private parties and host gov-
ernments+ The home government has an interest in broader principles of good-
faith treaty observance+ Treatment that violates a BIT qualiﬁes as a breach of the
fundamental principle of international law: pacta sunt servanda ~treaties are to be
30+ There is debate in the literature about the impact of BITs on investment ﬂows+ The small num-
ber of papers on the subject have generated inconsistent results+ The most recent and sophisticated
study of which we are aware, however, concludes that BITs do, indeed increase FDI and serve as a
substitute for good domestic institutional quality; see Neumayer and Spess 2005+ Other relevant stud-
ies include Hallward-Driemeier 2003; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2003; and UNCTAD 1998+
31+ We cast our argument in the credible commitments framework, but our competition argument
may be compatible with signaling theories as well+ Some of the empirical implications would be dif-
ferent than those we describe here, however+ If a BIT is a signaling device, we would expect more
reliable rather than less reliable property rights protectors to sign them+ We might also expect less
reliable governments to sign one treaty, rather than multiple treaties, since one should sufﬁce to send
the signal+ Empirically, we tend to observe multiple signings per host, which leads us to frame the
issue as one of credible commitments rather than costly signals that reveal type+ Both frameworks
could, however, explain a competitive dynamic to sign BITs+
32+ See Abbott et al+ 2000; Lipson 1991; and Guzman 2002+
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 823observed!+ Reneging on a contract governed by a treaty arrangement can damage
important foreign policy interests+
Finally, BITs raise ex post costs by signiﬁcantly enhancing contract enforce-
ment+ These agreements contain mandatory dispute settlement provisions that inves-
tors are entitled to use when they feel the host state has violated the relevant BIT+
Signiﬁcantly, investors can begin arbitration proceedings without the approval or
support of their home government+ Moreover, the host can neither prevent the legal
proceeding from going forward, nor control the ﬁnal decision of the international
arbitration tribunal+ The international tribunal can require a host found to be in
violation of its obligations to pay monetary damages+ The sovereign host state
could, of course, refuse to pay, but that decision could have even more profound
reputational consequences: when a government spurns the decision of a neutral
authoritative third party with which it has voluntarily precommitted to comply, a
range of important actors—public and private—are likely to infer that that govern-
ment is an unreliable economic partner+ By giving private parties a right to pursue
and receive a legal remedy, BITs boost the credibility of the host government’s
commitment+ As a result, we would expect some violations to be deterred by a
BIT commitment and expected returns to investments to increase accordingly+
Do these formal dispute settlement mechanisms actually come into play in the
way we have described? Theoretically, we should expect such arbitrations to be
rare, because fully informed parties should be able to settle “out of court” and
avoid litigation costs+ When we do observe arbitration, it would be more likely to
indicate information asymmetries than the seriousness of the case+33 Nonetheless,
a signiﬁcant number of cases have in fact gone to arbitration+ A recent conserva-
tive estimate puts the number at at least 160 cases+34 Due largely to controversial
measures taken by its government in early 2002, Argentina alone has recently been
a party to some thirty BIT arbitrations, most of them under ICSID and the rest
under UNCITRAL rules+35 BIT arbitrations have given rise to a number of signif-
icant awards, including recent decisions against the governments of the Czech
Republic ~$350 million!, Lebanon ~$266 million!, and Ecuador ~$70 million!+36
In short, BITs represent a credible commitment because of the range of ex post
costs—diplomatic costs, sovereignty costs, arbitration costs, and reputational
costs—involved in both their observance and their violation+ We argue below
that some governments have incentives to increase these costs in order to attract
FDI+
33+ This point has long been recognized in the law and economics literature, see Bebchuk 1984+
34+ UNCTAD 2004+ This number omits, of course, disputes that were resolved prior to the arbitra-
tion stage+
35+ See ^http:00www+bomchilgroup+org0argmar04+html#16&+ Accessed 20 June 2006+
36+ For examples of awards, see reports of the International Institute for Sustainable Development,
available at ^www+iisd+org0investment&+ Accessed 20 June 2006+ See also The National Law Journal,
Arbitration Survey, “Global Litigation,” 15 September 2003+ See also ^http:00blog+lewrockwell+com0
lewrw0archives0Friedman-BITs-9-15-03+pdf&+ Accessed 20 June 2006+
824 International OrganizationCompetitive BIT Signings: Logic and Implications
In the previous section we argued that BITs allow governments to credibly com-
mit themselves to protect investors’ property rights+ The ability to do so lowers
risks and increases expected returns to investment+ If this is the case, BITs can
be a mechanism—such as favorable tax treatment, lower wages, and efﬁcient
infrastructure—for making a jurisdiction a more attractive place in which to invest+
As with these other mechanisms, committing to a BIT involves costs for the host
government+ We characterize these as “sovereignty costs+” They are the costs any
government pays when it negotiates, ratiﬁes, and complies with an investment treaty+
We would include here the political costs of assembling a coalition in support of
foreign investors’ rights, as well as the costs associated with giving up a broad
range of policy instruments relevant to domestic social or developmental purposes
~taxation, regulation, performance requirements, property seizure, and currency
and capital restrictions!+ Most striking are the sovereignty costs associated with
the delegation of adjudicative authority: virtually any legal change or rule that
affects foreign investors is potentially subject to review by a foreign tribunal+ The
decision to sign a BIT always involves an assessment by the host of whether the
expected beneﬁt of attracting an additional increment of foreign capital outweighs
these costs+ In many cases, the answer is no+ In this section, we discuss the con-
ditions under which the expected beneﬁts for a particular government might out-
weigh these sovereignty costs+
BITs can attract capital from two broad resource pools+ First, they can shift
resources from consumption or domestic investment, effectively stimulating new
international capital investments that would not have been made absent the treaty+
Second, and more importantly for our theory, BITs can redirect international
capital ﬂows from one venue to another+ A BIT gives the host signatory a “repu-
tational advantage” over otherwise comparable rivals in the competition for ~re!dis-
tribution of an existing investment pool+37 The possibility of investment diversion
means that governments may have competitive reasons to implement BITs+ It is
the ability of a BIT—or at a minimum, its perceived ability—to give one country
an advantage over other similarly situated countries in the competition for capital
that we hypothesize as provoking many BIT signings+38
The strategic structure we are describing creates serious collective-action prob-
lems among potential host countries+ Collectively, they might be better off resist-
ing the demands of investors ~avoiding the sovereignty costs described above!,
but individually it is rational to sign in hopes of stimulating capital inﬂows+ In
recognition of this dynamic, one ﬁnds cases of regional attempts to coordinate
host resistance+ In the Caribbean, for example, collective efforts have been made
37+ This redistributive effect contrasts with customary international law, under which all potential
hosts have the same obligations and enjoy the same beneﬁts+
38+ Guzman 1998 provides a more complete discussion of the potential impact of competition on
BITs+
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 825to reduce BIT concessions,39 though predictably the “cartel” has been difﬁcult
to maintain+40 The breakdown of such efforts is consistent with the competitive
context we believe accounts for the proliferation of BITs over the past several
years+
A competitive theory of BITs has at least four observable implications+ First,
BITs should diffuse among host country competitors—countries that, from an
investor’s point of view, are closely substitutable venues for investment+ It is pre-
cisely these countries that should display the clearest evidence of interdependent
decision making+ This is a unique prediction of competitive theory+ No other dif-
fusion mechanism—whether hegemonic, cognitive, or ideational—makes this spe-
ciﬁc prediction+
Second, BITs should spread most readily to countries where the competition for
capital is the most intense+ Competition intensiﬁes where the number of plausible
hosts for a particular investment project is greatest+ For this reason, host compe-
tition for investment in extractive goods is far less intense than in light manufac-
tures: while the number of countries in which bauxite mining is proﬁtable is quite
limited, almost any jurisdiction can host a Nike plant+ If our competition hypoth-
esis is correct, these treaties should be more prevalent where host competition is
most ﬁerce: in light manufactures rather than in primary production or extractive
industries+ This prediction is the exact opposite of what one might expect were
BITs propelled in a “hegemonic” fashion, by the home country+ From a home
government’s point of view, theories of obsolescing bargaining should predict the
need for enforceable investment protections precisely in those industries that involve
large upfront difﬁcult-to-relocate investments+ Obsolescing bargaining41 suggests
that investors are more likely to demand treaties to protect their extractive and
primary production investments, at least relative to easier-to-relocate light
manufactures+42
Third, BITs should spread as the pool of available capital grows+ As the pool of
global capital grows, any competitive advantage ~such as that conferred by a BIT!
should yield a larger marginal increase in FDI inﬂows+ Thus, the expected return
per BIT should increase with the size of the investment pool, which encourages
39+ CARICOM countries, for example, produced a document entitled “Guidelines for Use in the
Negotiation of Bilateral Treaties” that states, among other things, that CARICOM countries should not
accept any restriction on the use of performance obligations and that they should retain the right to
nationalize and to “determine at the time of nationalization the quantum of compensation and the terms
of payment+” Caribbean Community Secretariat, reproduced in “UNCTAD, International Investment
Instruments: A Compendium,”V o l + III+
40+ Jamaica, a member of CARICOM when the guidelines were adopted, signed a string of BITs
with important partners in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the United Kingdom ~1987!; Swit-
zerland ~1990!; the Netherlands ~1991!; Germany ~1992!; France ~1993!; Italy ~1993!; the United States
~1994!; Argentina ~1994!; and China ~1994!+ These BITs include performance requirements and com-
pensation provisions that are inconsistent with the CARICOM guidelines+
41+ See Vernon 1971; and Vernon 1977+
42+ Kobrin 1987 ﬁnds that manufacturing is not characterized by the inherent, structurally based
and secular obsolescence that is found in the natural resource-based industries+
826 International Organizationhosts to scramble to improve access to a share of the bigger “pie+” While other
researchers have suggested that BITs may contribute to a growth in FDI,43 our
theory suggests a possible feedback loop: the expectation of greater payoffs may
stimulate more treaties+ This relationship is not predicted by more sociological
explanations, which might expect BITs to proliferate as a function of the density
of BITs themselves, rather than the growing volume of investment+ Nor is it pre-
dicted by learning theories, which would presumably require a demonstration that
BITs actually “work” in attracting capital+
Finally, while all countries should be subject to some degree to the competitive
pressures we have theorized above, BITs should diffuse somewhat more readily
among host governments that lack credibility+ For these countries, a BIT can be
expected to make a real difference to investors, other factors held constant+ In
countries that already have institutions and practices that are favorable to inves-
tors, transparent, and predictable, a costly BIT adds relatively little value+ These
states may be able to compete for capital on the basis of their “inherent” credibil-
ity+ This relationship is in principle consistent with power-based explanations ~pow-
erful home governments may be more likely to demand BITs from unreliable hosts
than inherently reliable ones!, but it is much less consistent with more socio-
logical accounts discussed in Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett in this issue+ If gov-
ernments have been “socialized” to accept the dominant paradigm for investor
protection, there would be no reason for the more credible host governments to
largely exempt themselves+
A competitive theory of BITs predicts that the host countries most likely to sign
treaties will be those whose competitors have signed, those who depend on man-
ufacturing over extractive production, and those with a credibility gap+ More gen-
erally, a competitive theory predicts increased treaties as the pool of available capital
grows+ In the following section, we develop an empirical strategy for testing these
hypotheses against alternative explanations+
Empirical Methods and Data
Analytical Design
We use an event history framework to estimate the duration of time before two
countries sign a BIT+ Our analysis begins in 1958, the year before the ﬁrst BIT,
and includes those BITs concluded up to 1 January 2000, the last year for which
we have accurate data+ Since the focus of the analysis is a bilateral agreement
between governments in a given year, the appropriate unit of analysis is the coun-
try dyad–year+ In each dyad, we identify the potential “home” and the potential
“host” country based on their relative level of development, as measured by GDP
per capita+ Of course, such designations become less meaningful the closer the
43+ Neumayer and Spess 2005+
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tries of a similar level of development—especially at the higher end—are consid-
erably less likely+ In the reported analyses we exclude “developed dyads” from
the sample in order to minimize the bias from estimates derived from “irrelevant
dyads+”44 Otherwise our sample includes all independent states, as identiﬁed by
Gleditsch and Ward+45
Event history methods offer a convenient way to incorporate time dependence
in models of policy or innovation adoption+ Our formulation is slightly more com-
plicated than most since the unit of analysis is the country dyad and the model
includes variables measured for one or the other member of the dyad as well as
for the dyad itself+ We estimate the following equation:
yij,t  aXi,t  bZj,t  dVij,t  rWyt1
*  «ij
where yij is the number of years without a BIT between countries i ~host! and j
~home!, X is a vector of conditions that affect country i’s calculations, Z is a vec-
tor of conditions that affect country j’s calculations, V is a vector of characteris-
tics of the relationship between countries i and j, and Wy* is a vector of spatial
lag terms in which a count of BITs among other host countries in the previous
year ~y*! is weighted by various measures of their distance ~W! to country i ~see
our discussion of spatial lags below!+ We estimate this equation with a Cox pro-
portional hazard model, a useful estimator when one does not have strong assump-
tions about the effect of time on the baseline hazard+
Data and Measures
Our dependent variable is the number of years a dyad goes without a treaty, marked
by the year of a treaty’s signing, rather than the year in which it enters into force+46
We reason that the signing not only approximates the moment during which a
government deliberates over the treaty but is also the more important event for
44+ We exclude dyads in which both members are classiﬁed as “high income countries” by the
World Bank @that is, dyads in which both members have a GDP per capita of over $6,000 ~in 1987
$US! in a given year#, thus excluding 125 BITs in the analysis+
45+ Gleditsch and Ward 1999+ Restricting our sample to those states ~and their dates of existence!
identiﬁed by Gleditsch and Ward means that we exclude eighteen BITs listed in the UNCTAD data,
such as the fourteen to which Hong Kong was party as well as those involving states such as the
United Arab Emirates and Slovenia, which occur several years prior to the dates that Gleditsch and
Ward list the states as independent+ The relatively inclusive sample ensures that we will encounter
missing data, particularly for smaller countries+ We experiment with several methods of managing
missing data, none of which alter the substantive ﬁndings+ For the results below, we have estimated
missing values of time-varying covariates with decade means where possible and appropriate+ Such
extrapolations buy a more inclusive sample at the expense of potentially underestimated standard errors;
see King et al+ 2001+
46+ While approximately forty dyads have entered into second and, in one case, third treaties, we
predict the duration until the ﬁrst treaty+
828 International Organizationpurposes of sending a proinvestment signal to international markets+47 Both
UNCTAD and the World Bank’s ICSID track the date and signatories of BITs+
While the two sources basically agree, UNCTAD’s list is more recent and more
comprehensive+48 As the equation above indicates, our independent variables take
on one of four analytic forms: ~1! independent factors associated with the “home”
country; ~2! independent factors associated with the “host” country; ~3! factors
associated with the relationship between host and home countries; and ~4! spatial
lags of the dependent variable+
Spatial lags of the dependent variable: Competition and cultural emula-
tion. To assess the source and strength of the various inﬂuences of policy dif-
fusion we construct a series of spatial lags, modeled largely after those in Sim-
mons and Elkins+49 Spatial lag models treat spatial dependence in the same way
time-series models treat serial correlation+50 Instead of ~or, in our case, in addition
to! lagging the value of the dependent variable one unit in time, one “lags” it one
~or more! units in space to capture the behavior of neighbors+ Thus, the general
formulation of the spatial lag above, Wy*, in which W is an N by N by T spatial
weights matrix that maps the distances between units for each year and y* is an N
by T matrix of values that represent some function of the dependent variable for
all countries other than i+ In our case, y* represents the sum total of BITs in force
for each host country in a given year+51 We then compute the weighted average of
y* by dividing the sum of its product with W, by a row sum of W+ Thus, the spa-
tial lag for country i using the weight w is as follows,

wij yj
*  wikyk
*  {{{  winyn
*
wij  wik {{{  win
This computation of Wy* allows an intuitive interpretation of the spatial lag: it is
the average number of BITs in force among other host countries, weighted by
some distance to country i+ Since the spatial lag is endogenous, we lag it one year
47+ “As the great majority of BITs are ratiﬁed, it is reasonable to assume that, in the perception of
investors, signing a BIT is the crucial action: Once a BIT is signed, or expected to be signed, the
market has absorbed it or begins to absorb it”; UNCTAD 1998, 106+
48+ Our comparison of the two data sets found that, for the years they overlapped ~1959–97!,
UNCTAD included over two hundred treaties not included in the ICSID database+
49+ Simmons and Elkins 2004+
50+ Anselin 1988+
51+ This formulation assumes that it is the accumulation of treaties among peers, not the “event” of
their recent signing, that provokes a response+ We also experimented with an event trigger by calcu-
lating the number of BITs signed by others in the previous year+ In fact, the results were largely
comparable+
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 829to capture the behavior of other host countries in the previous year, a chronology
that makes more sense for the causal logic of diffusion as well+52 Note that the W
matrix can represent not only geographic distances, but also economic, cultural,
or political distances among countries+53
Our theory predicts interdependent decision making among host countries that
compete for the same sources of global capital+ Thus we need to determine the
“competitive distance” between hosts+ We create spatial weights that capture this
distance in three ways+ The ﬁrst measures the degree to which host governments
compete in the same foreign markets; that is, whether they have the same export
trade relationships+54 ~All data sources and descriptive statistics are provided in
the Data Appendix+! This is a useful indicator because trade competitors are also
likely to be competitors for FDI and empirical studies show that the two are strongly
correlated+ We reason that countries that compete for export markets are structur-
ally positioned to compete for the same sources of FDI as well+ The second mea-
sure records the degree to which nations export the same basket of goods+55 This
measure captures the idea that investors choose between alternative locations for
direct investment that they consider close substitutes with respect to the countries’
traditional export products+ For example, an automobile manufacturer might con-
sider investing in countries that produce steel but will be unlikely to consider those
whose leading export is cocoa+ Our third measure captures the degree to which
countries have similar educational and infrastructural resources+ Assuming that
potential foreign direct investors are concerned with a country’s human assets as
well as its technological and communications infrastructure, we reason that coun-
tries with similar educational and infrastructural proﬁles will compete for the same
52+ While spatial lags are common solutions to estimating the relational effects that we hypoth-
esize, they do introduce a potential degree of endogeneity+ Unless nondiffusion predictors are included
in the model, spatial lags can absorb these effects when the domestic variables are correlated within
the network+ For this reason, some scholars have moved towards simultaneous equation modeling, in
order to model the endogeneity+ Recent Monte Carlo evidence reported in Franzese and Hays 2004
suggests that the costs associated with such models may outweigh their beneﬁts in large samples+ Our
solution is to specify the nondiffusion components as completely as possible and to lag the spatial lag
one year+ Nonetheless, we recognize that effects from spatial lags may be slightly inﬂated+
53+ See Elkins and Simmons 2005; and Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006+
54+ We use the IMF Direction of Trade data to produce an N by N by T matrix of correlations
~between countries! across the countries’ proportion of exports to each of the 182 partner countries+
Two countries that export goods in the same proportions to 182 countries will have a score of 1; while
those with entirely opposite relationships will have score of 1+ For a similar approach, see Finger
and Kreinin 1979+ Network analysts often use this sort of measure to identify competitors; see Wasser-
man and Faust 1994+
55+ We calculate the distance between countries according to their export products, using informa-
tion from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators ~WDI! that describes a country’s export
mix+ These indicators tap the value of exports ~in 1995 $US! in sectors such as food, fuel, agricultural
raw materials, ores and metals, and arms+ We calculate the correlation between countries for each year
across thirteen such indicators+ The result is a measure, ranging from 1t o1 , of the similarity between
countries according to the products they export+
830 International Organizationpool of capital+56 For all three competition measures, we compute a spatial lag by
anchoring the distances ~measured as correlations! at zero by adding 1 to each
score and then using these distances to calculate a weighted sum of BITs in force
in all other host countries in the previous year+
The competition distances themselves appear to have a fair degree of validity+
For example, Figure 6 plots the values for the “distance” in export products between
Brazil and select countries across time+ If these values are to be believed, Brazil’s
products correlated quite highly with those of most Latin American countries in
the 1960s and 1970s+ This correlation decreased in the 1990s, at which time Brazil’s
export proﬁle began to resemble that of the United States and Canada more than
that of its Latin American neighbors+ This ﬁnding is consistent with the common
interpretation of the increasingly diversiﬁed Brazilian economy, whose exports in
everything from technology to agriculture now compete directly with the United
States and less directly with smaller Latin American states+57
We also use spatial lags in a similar way to measure the inﬂuence of an impor-
tant alternative explanation suggested in Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett58—that
of cultural peers+ We use three measures of “cultural distance”: predominant reli-
gion, colonial heritage, and predominant language+ The spatial lag for these “dis-
tances” is calculated in the same weighted-average manner as for the competitive
distances+ Unlike the competition measures, the cultural distances are binary; a
country either shares a common language with another, or it does not+ The cul-
tural spatial lags, therefore, are equivalent to the mean number of BITs in force
among those host countries with the same cultural identity ~religion, language, or
colonial heritage!+ These measures capture an important possibility: that BITs result
more from socially constructed emulation of policies of important reference groups
than from hard-nosed economic competition+ Note that this measure does not cap-
ture whether BITs are more likely between cultural peers, an effect we test with
the cultural distance variables themselves ~see below!+
Alternative diffusion mechanisms: Learning and coercion. Finally, we seek
to capture the effects of policy learning and coercion+ Our notion of learning, con-
sistent with that articulated in Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett,59 implies that poli-
cymakers from host countries are motivated to sign BITs based on the treaties’
demonstrated beneﬁts ~speciﬁcally, increased FDI!+ Our model does not assume
that policymakers have Herculean powers of observation or analysis; nor does it
treat them as remedial statisticians+ We assume simply that policymakers assess
the success of countries in attracting investment over recent years given the coun-
56+ We compare such investment proﬁles by calculating correlations, by year, between countries
across roughly ﬁfteen educational and infrastructural variables selected from the WDI+ These distances
range from 1t o1 +
57+ Baer 2001+
58+ Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, this volume+
59+ Ibid+
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 831FIGURE 6. A measure of export market similarity: The Brazilian case
8
3
2
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
O
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
ntries’ level of development and their number of treaties in force during this time+
We replicate this cognitive process by regressing, each year, the average FDI inﬂows
as a percentage of GDP for the previous ﬁve years on the average number of trea-
ties in force for that country during that period as well as its average GDP per
capita+ The standardized regression coefﬁcient for the BITs variable in each of
these yearly equations is our indicator of a policymaker’s estimate of the payoff
of these treaties in terms of increased investment+60 Thus, we assume that each
year decision makers observe and draw conclusions about the effects of BITs on
investment, controlling for a country’s level of development, and that all actors
observe the same signal+
Because FDI data is sparse in the 1960s, the effect of the treaties is incalculable
with any degree of certainty, both for us and for policymakers at the time+ Through-
out the 1970s and most of the 1980s, the apparent effect of BITs is effectively
zero or even negative+ However, by the early 1990s—the period in which more
than half of existing BITs were signed—BITs appear to have obvious payoffs+ Those
countries with BITs in force in those years are clearly also the recipients of invest-
ment+61 The coefﬁcient in 1990, for example, suggests that each BIT in force is
associated with an extra +05 percent of GDP in investment+ Thus, a country with
50 BITs ~for example, Chile! has almost 2+5 percent of its GDP ~that is, for Chile,
more than $1 billion! in investment more than a country without a BIT+ This is the
difference between having no FDI and having the worldwide average for a low-
or middle-income country, for which gross FDI averages around 2+3 percent of
GDP+ To an observant host country in 1990, BITs would certainly appear to have
some demonstrable beneﬁts+
We consider one ﬁnal interdependent mechanism, coercion+ It may be that poten-
tial hosts are coerced or at least strongly encouraged to enter into BITs+ If so, a
likely juncture for the application of such pressure is at the time a country seeks
International Monetary Fund ~IMF! credits+ We incorporate a dichotomous mea-
sure of whether or not a country has drawn on IMF resources in a given year+
Though we do not believe the pursuit of or entry into BITs is explicitly stipulated
in formal loan conditions, there may be more subtle pressures on a state in balance-
of-payments difﬁculties to use these treaties to attract foreign capital+
Home country considerations. The proliferation of BITs could be explained
by two home country considerations: the desire to protect existing overseas capi-
tal, and the desire for additional investments+ These considerations could signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence the pool of BITs that is potentially available, independently of
60+ In order to compute these results, we use only those data that are immediately available to us
~and, more to the point, to policymakers!+ We reason that our informational constraints should match
those of policymakers+ As such, we use data reported in the World Bank’s WDI and do not make
efforts to impute or otherwise ﬁll in missing data in these equations+
61+ Such mixed results do not seem surprising given the discrepant ﬁndings of scholars on this
question ~see fn+ 30!+
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 833any competitive dynamic among potential hosts+ In the analysis that follows, we
control for the total FDI “exposure” of the home country; that is, the degree to
which a country’s capital is actually invested abroad+ For this we use a measure of
net FDI outﬂows as a proportion of GDP ~scored positively when outﬂows out-
weigh inﬂows and negatively when inﬂows outweigh outﬂows!+ On average, we
expect high outﬂows to produce a greater willingness to supply BITs on the part
of investors’ governments+
In models not reported here, we also include country dummies for the identity
of home governments with the most active BIT programs ~Germany, Switzerland,
France, United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States! in order to absorb any idio-
syncratic tendencies to pursue BITs and to capture the effect of large BIT programs+
Host country considerations. Our competitive story of the proliferation of BITs
suggests that competitive reputation building, through BITs, can set off a sequence
of treaty signings among countries that compete with one another+ Although all
countries may be subject to such competitive pressures to some degree, we expect
governments with greater indigenous credibility to be less willing to pay the sov-
ereignty and other political costs associated with concluding BITs+ We capture this
idea by using an indicator of investors’perceptions of corruption in the host coun-
try+ The more corrupt a state is perceived to be, the more necessary it becomes to
lure investors with an explicit promise to delegate adjudication to an authoritative
third party+ We complement this measure with one of the nature of the legal sys-
tem itself+ Some research suggests that common law systems tend to provide bet-
ter property rights protections;62 civil law systems are more likely, these scholars
argue, to implement regulatory solutions to perceived social conﬂict63—arguably,
the kind of approach likely to make external capital ﬂinch+ If civil law systems are
less oriented toward credible rules of capital protection, governments in those sys-
tems should more frequently reach for an external commitment mechanism, such
as a BIT+64 Finally, we would like to use a measure of the extent to which the
host’s legal system is perceived by foreign investors as strong and impartial+ Unfor-
tunately, the measure that appears to be most appropriate for tapping legal strength
and impartiality ~“law and order”! is confounded by the inclusion of investors’
assessment of popular observance of the law, which likely has little to do with the
judiciary’s attitude toward foreign investors+ Nonetheless, our argument implies
that a reputation for “law and order” should reduce a host’s need to sign a BIT+
Another important factor, and one with implications for our competition story,
has to do with a country’s exposure to competition+ If BITs are driven by compe-
62+ La Porta et al+ 1997 and 1998+
63+ Botero et al+ 2002+
64+ We use an indicator of a English Common law tradition generated by the World Bank and used
by La Porta et al; see Easterly and Sewadeh 2001+ We have some misgivings about using this measure
to capture reputation for property rights protections, especially since Simmons ~forthcoming! has shown
that common law countries are much less likely to sign human rights treaties, which points to a more
general orientation toward international treaties of all kinds+
834 International Organizationtition for capital, they should be most prevalent where that competition is most
ﬁerce+ We have argued that competition for capital is most cutthroat in manufac-
turing; by comparison, there are limited sites worldwide that produce copper or
other extractive commodities+ The fewer the alternative investment sites, the more
protected the host is from international competition, and the less likely a host is to
sign a BIT+ To capture this idea, we construct a measure of extractive industry
dependence by summing the share of each country’s exports of both fuel and “ores
and metals,” as recorded in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators ~WDI!+
Approaches emphasizing the coercive role of dominant powers would anticipate a
positive coefﬁcient for extractive industries, since these are most subject to obsolesc-
ing bargaining and hence intensiﬁed political risks+ Our expectation, however, is
that this effect will be swamped by competition among hosts for manufacturing
FDI, and we anticipate a negative effect+ The outcome on the extractive industry
variable thus provides a fairly crisp test of the importance of competition among
hosts in explaining the proliferation of BITs+
Quite aside from indicators of the need for a credible commitment discussed
above, a number of economic conditions make particular hosts especially attrac-
tive BIT partners+ We control for the economic desirability of the investment site
by controlling for market size of the host country ~log of the host’s GDP!,65 the
host’s level of development ~GDP per capita!,66 the quality of the host’s work-
force ~rate of illiteracy!, and the host’s growth ~GDP growth rate!+67 We also include
a rather direct measure of the host’s attractiveness for capital: FDI net inﬂows in
the previous year, as a percentage of GDP+68
Finally, we control for other political and policy conditions in the host country+
Since investors may see democracies as less capricious, we control for the host’s
level of democracy+ It is possible that the pattern of BITs is driven by a few coun-
tries’ aggressive privatization programs, and so we control for the value of privat-
ized assets in a given year+ Finally, we recognize that to sign BITs requires a certain
degree of diplomatic capacity+ We account for the diplomatic and legal capacity to
enter into BITs by controlling for the total number of embassies a country hosts
and has established in foreign countries+69 A host with extensive diplomatic repre-
sentation is more likely to have the international political and legal capacity to
conclude a larger volume of treaties+
Characteristics of country pairs. In this analytic category we identify the rela-
tional variables that might be associated with the likelihood of an agreement
65+ See Kobrin 1976; and Wheeler and Mody 1992+
66+ Henisz 2000+
67+ See Kobrin 1976; and Wheeler and Mody 1992+
68+ The literature on agglomeration economies, stressing the increasing beneﬁts of colocation by
economic units, provides a justiﬁcation for including prior FDI inﬂows; see Wheeler and Mody 1992+
As current and future FDI is likely affected by the very agreements we predict in this model, we lag
the measure one year+
69+ See Guzman and Simmons 2005+
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 835between the two nations+ We focus on three kinds of relationships: business, secu-
rity, and cultural relationships+ Since ﬁrms are likely to want to invest in or near
their export markets and to otherwise take advantage of vertical downstream link-
ages,70 we control for the intensity of business transactions, proxied by the extent
of trade between the two countries+ Investment agreements may also have a for-
eign policy71 or even a security rationale as well+ To address this possibility, we
include a measure of the intensity of the alliance relationship for each pair+ We
also consider the possibility that BITs reﬂect cultural relationships, although this
variable could have opposing effects+ On the one hand, it may be easier for states
with cultural similarities to negotiate successfully+ On the other hand, if cultural
similarities also reduce the perceived risks of investment, a common culture might
operate in the opposite direction, reducing the need for a BIT+ We test the relation-
ship between cultural characteristics and BIT signing by coding country pairs with
shared language and colonial traditions+ Note that these variables should not be
confused with the cultural spatial lags, which are measures of a host’s peers’treaty
activity+
Findings
We present estimates ~as hazard ratios! from three speciﬁcations of our model
~Table 2!+ A hazard ratio of more than 1 represents a positive effect on the odds of
a BIT; less than 1, a negative effect+ The ﬁrst regression includes the export part-
ner lag together with the full set of covariates described above+ The last two regres-
sions include one of the remaining two competitive spatial lags ~export product
similarity and infrastructure0workforce similarity! in a reduced form of the model+
Several clear empirical patterns begin to emerge+ There is fairly consistent and
convincing evidence of the importance of competition for capital among develop-
ing countries in explaining the proliferation of BITs over the past four decades+ In
all cases, higher rates of BIT signing among competitors ~however measured! appear
to have increased the rate at which a given country itself enters into a BIT at
statistically signiﬁcant levels+ One can appreciate the size of these effects in Fig-
ure 7a, which plots the survival curve for two different values of the spatial lag
calculated from the “export product similarity” measure, the competition variable
with the largest impact+ In this illustration, a country whose competitors average
70+ The literature that has focused on ﬁrm and industry level explanations for the location of FDI
emphasizes that ﬁrms that depend on foreign sales are more likely to invest overseas+ For example,
some research suggests that a ﬁrm’s decision to deepen its presence in a particular country is inﬂu-
enced by the extent of its prior experience in that jurisdiction; see Ball and Tschoegl 1982+ Others
have found that ﬁrms are more likely to invest where they have strategic advantages, and these are
plausibly connected with vertical downstream linkages; see Kimura 1989+ The measure proposed here
assumed these effects may show up in the aggregate trade relationships at the national level+
71+ See Gowa 1994; and Pollins 1989+
836 International OrganizationTABLE 2. A model of BIT signings: Cox proportional hazard model
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Competitive theory
bits among export market competitors 1+05***
~0+01!
bits among export product competitors 1+11***
~0+04!
bits among infrastructure competitors 1+04
~0+02!**
average annual global fdi flows 1+32*** 1+53*** 1+46***
~0+12!~ 0+14!~ 0+13!
host extractive industries/exports 0+73** 0+73** 0+72***
~0+09!~ 0+09!~ 0+09!
perceptions of host corruption 1+03 1+01 1+01
~0+04!~ 0+04!~ 0+04!
host legal tradition (common law) 0+66*** 0+65*** 0+66***
~0+05!~ 0+05!~ 0+05!
Alternative diffusion explanations
bits among those with same religion 0+99 0+98 0+99
~0+01!~ 0+01!~ 0+01!
bits among those with same language 1+01
~0+06!
bits among those with same colonizer 0+99
~0+04!
learning from success 1+85** 1+83* 2+13*
~0+42!~ 0+61!~ 0+94!
coercion: host use of imf credits 1+44*** 1+39*** 1+43***
~0+12!~ 0+11!~ 0+12!
Host control variables
host gdp (ln) 1+07* 1+03 1+04
~0+04!~ 0+04!~ 0+04!
host gdp/capita 1+00 1+00 0+99
~0+03!~ 0+03!~ 0+03!
host gdp growth 0+97*** 0+97*** 0+97***
~0+01!~ 0+01!~ 0+01!
host net fdi inflows (% of gdp), t−11 +01 1+01 1+01
~0+01!~ 0+01!~ 0+01!
host illiteracy rate 0+34*** 0+30*** 0+30***
~0+06!~ 0+05!~ 0+06!
host capital account/gdp 1+01 1+01** 1+01**
~0+01!~ 0+01!~ 0+01!
host law and order 1+34*** 1+39*** 1+38***
~0+05!~ 0+05!~ 0+05!
host democracy 0+99 0+99 0+99
~0+01!~ 0+01!~ 0+01!
host diplomatic representation 1+01*** 1+01*** 1+01***
~0+00!~ 0+00!~ 0+00!
host privatization record 1+05*** 1+06*** 1+06***
~0+02!~ 0+02!~ 0+02!
Home control variables
home net fdi outflows (% of gdp) 1+13*** 1+14*** 1+14***
~0+02!~ 0+02!~ 0+02!
~continued!
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 837ﬁfteen agreements has a markedly increased risk of signing an agreement com-
pared with a country whose competitors have refrained from signing+ In the late
1990s ~40 years after the inception of BITs!, the difference between such coun-
tries in their probability of signing is almost 0+20+ The results of these three com-
petition variables alone provide preliminary evidence that competition is central
to the spread of BITs+
The evidence also suggests that as global FDI has increased, potential hosts
have been more willing to sign BITs+ One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that as
the pool of FDI has increased, the competitive stakes for a share have grown+ The
pattern with respect to countries with predominantly extractive industries also pro-
vides corroboratory evidence for the competition theory+ The results show that
higher extractive production by the potential host reduces the propensity to nego-
tiate a BIT ~contrary to expectations based on investors’ demands to address
obsolescing bargains endemic to primary and extractive production!+ Figure 7b,
which compares the signing rates for a government with a largely extractive-
based economy versus one with an exclusively manufacturing-based economy, sug-
gests that—ceteris paribus—signing rates can differ by as much as 10 percentage
points depending on a state’s level of extractive material exports+ Both the mag-
nitude and stability of this effect across models suggests that it is a fairly robust
ﬁnding+
We found inconsistent evidence, however, to support our expectation that host
countries with a credibility gap are most likely to sign a BIT+ Contrary to expec-
TABLE 2. Continued
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dyadic control variables
dyadic trade (% of host’s gdp) 1+59* 1+61 1+64
~0+35!~ 0+56!~ 0+57!
common colonial heritage 0+41*** 0+40*** 0+41***
~0+09!~ 0+09!~ 0+09!
common language 1+57*** 1+55*** 1+54***
~0+19!~ 0+19!~ 0+19!
alliance 1+18* 1+20* 1+18
~0+10!~ 0+11!~ 0+14!
Common “shocks”
cold war 0+37*** 0+31*** 0+32***
~0+08!~ 0+06!~ 0+06!
number of bits globally, by year 1+03 1+00 1+01
~0+03!~ 0+03!~ 0+03!
Observations 206,766 208,610 201,073
Number of country pairs analyzed 6,781 6,831 6,828
Number of BITs 1,125 1,140 1,137
Log likelihood 8723+114 8858+474 8823+590
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses+
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%+
838 International OrganizationFIGURE 7a. Survival estimates according to the average number of BITs of host’s
competitors (measured by export product similarity)
FIGURE 7b. Survival estimates according to host’s percent of exports in
extractive industries
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 839tation, BITs were more likely to be signed by countries with better reputations for
“law and order+” We have already noted that this indicator only partially reﬂects
our argument, as it conﬂates perceptions of the strength of the court system with
perceptions of popular willingness to obey the law+ Even so, the strong positive
result is surprising+ One possibility is that this measure is picking up the relatively
favorable orientation of some countries toward legal solutions to conﬂicts gener-
ally+ As we expected, perceptions of corruption were in the correct direction,
although the hazard ratio is not statistically signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation that
also contains “law and order+” We should note that corruption is a signiﬁcant deter-
minant of signing a BIT whenever the law and order variable is not included+
The common law variable did work as anticipated, but in light of the above ﬁnd-
ings, we think the prudent conclusion is that common law countries also refrain
from entering into these agreements for reasons other than the reputational con-
cerns developed here+72
In addition to the competition variables, our coercion variable ~use of IMF cred-
its! is signiﬁcant in each of the models+ This may mean that states seeking assis-
tance from the IMF are encouraged to enter into BITs+ Alternatively, it may be
that the conditionality of IMF loans overlaps with the obligations of the BIT, reduc-
ing the costs of the latter+ Interestingly, there is some evidence of learning from
BIT outcomes+ BITs are signiﬁcantly more likely to be signed during years in which
signatory states appear to be beneﬁting ~in terms of FDI! from the treaties than
when they are not+ Such a pattern, of course, is consistent with our general theory
of competition over shares of FDI+ We found no evidence, however, that countries
sign agreements in response to signings in their cultural networks+ None of the
spatial lags along religion, language, or colonial heritage had consequential effects+
Many of the variables that would predict home country interest in offering a
BIT to a developing country had somewhat unpredictable, and muted, effects+ The
size of the host economy and previous FDI inﬂows ~as a percentage of host GDP!
showed effects in the predicted direction, although rarely statistically signiﬁcant
across the models we tested+ Meanwhile GDP per capita and economic growth
had, if anything, the opposite effects of what we would expect, although only the
economic growth coefﬁcients were signiﬁcant+ On the other hand, we did ﬁnd evi-
dence that countries with a high quality workforce, as measured by literacy rates,
and with an export orientation ~current accounts tending toward surplus!, were
more likely to sign BITs ~illiteracy is associated with a reduced likelihood of a
BIT!+ Our prediction that privatization programs in a host country would coincide
with BIT agreements was borne out as well+ Similarly, host countries with a larger
diplomatic presence were also more likely to enter into BITs+ Finally, host’s degree
of democracy had practically no effect+
Certain control variables describing the relationships between home and host
countries were important predictors of BITs+ While the direction of dyadic trade is
72+ Simmons forthcoming+
840 International Organizationas hypothesized, the effect is statistically insigniﬁcant in two of the three models+
Political and cultural relationships seem to be more important+ In accordance with
expectations, BITs are more likely among allies, which could suggest a somewhat
coercive element to their conclusion+ A common language within the dyad makes
it much more likely that a pair of countries will negotiate a BIT, but a colonial
link reduces by about two-thirds the likelihood that a country pair will do so+ Per-
haps investors in home countries perceive the risk in their colonial “families” to
be lower than in other states+ After all, colonies’ legal institutions are likely to be
similar to, if not partially overlap with, legal institutions in the mother country
and fellow former colonies+ This ﬁts with our conception of BITs as being created
to establish a credible legal framework for investment that is otherwise lacking+
In models not reported here, we attempted also to control for the BIT “pro-
grams” of particularly active countries by including country dummy variables for
the ﬁve most active hosts and the ﬁve most active home countries+ All were highly
signiﬁcant, with the partial exceptions of Germany and the United States+ Their
inclusion reduced substantially the effect of two variables, the volume of bilateral
trade between country pairs and the home country net FDI+ The robustness of the
other results to the country dummies, however, reassures us that our results are
not driven by idiosyncratic policies in a few of the most active countries+
Finally, we consider the potential impact of commonly experienced “shocks”
on the propensity to sign BITs+ All countries could have been affected by the Cold
War, and our results indicate a signiﬁcantly lower propensity to sign BITs during
that era+ Our more general measure of BIT period effects ~the number of BITs
signed in a given year!, however, is insigniﬁcant in the company of our fairly
comprehensive model+ Whatever temporal clusters were evident in Figure 1 are
accounted for by predictors in our model+
Conclusion
The use of bilateral investment treaties has grown signiﬁcantly since the early 1960s+
Their growth is especially remarkable given the outright rebellion many hosts have
staged against customary law understandings and multilateral codiﬁcations of inves-
tors’ rights that are quite similar to those contained in these proliferating bilateral
accords+ Why the disjuncture? How can we understand the spread of these pro-
market agreements across time and space?
The diffusion mechanisms spelled out by Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett in the
introduction to this series of studies suggest a broad range of empirically veriﬁ-
able hypotheses about movement towards BITs+ Both theoretically and empiri-
cally, the competition model seems most apt in this case+ These treaties are meant
to improve conditions under which global capital relocates, prospers, and repatri-
ates+ They are also meant to raise the reputational stakes for governments of capital-
poor economies by committing them to respect property and contractual rights
of foreign investors and to agree to arbitration—effectively clipping their
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 841sovereignty—in the event of any disagreement over subsequent investment con-
tracts+ There are clearly possibilities here for mutual gain for hosts and investors,
though we are agnostic about the global welfare effects of these treaties, given
their potential redistributive consequences+ We admit that some of the more recent
treaties between very poor countries do not square with our straightforward com-
petitive model; nonetheless, the strongest case can be made for a competitive dif-
fusion dynamic in this case+
Let us begin with the project’s null hypothesis: that country characteristics or
commonly experienced shocks explain the pattern of BIT signings+ There was plenty
of support in the data for traditional economic explanations+ Some of the most
important drivers of the spread of BITs are likely factors that drive investment
decisions more generally+ The pattern of BITs shows that home governments want
to secure investments in developing markets that are large, somewhat open, and
with high quality labor+ On the other hand, BITs are most valuable where political
risk is endemic+ China, which has concluded a large number of BITs with both
rich and poor partners, would be the quintessential BIT partner, according to our
model+
We also found strong evidence that dyadic characteristics explain BITs+ BITs
are much more likely to be negotiated among country pairs of the same culture ~at
least as measured by shared language! and among country pairs with strong secu-
rity commitments+ But if cultural linkages explain home-host pairs, cultural emu-
lation is much less in evidence among potential hosts+ Not one indicator of cultural
emulation among hosts had any purchase at all on the adoption of BITs+ These
cultural arguments may in the end be a more satisfying account available for the
growing category of “strange BITs” between highly indebted, capital-poor, non-
contiguous country pairs+ We know anecdotally that third parties ~France,
UNCTAD! facilitated many of these agreements, indicating that in many cases
external political or cultural forces may be crucial+ The strong positive effect of
IMF borrowing and alliance relationships on the propensity to sign a BIT also
reminds us that a certain degree of coercion may be at play in some cases+
We do not doubt that multiple motives exist for the spread of this form of pro-
tection for foreign investors+ But the competitive explanation has strong theoreti-
cal foundations and is the most consistently supported by the data+ First, it was
well supported by three different measures of “competitive space”: by export mar-
ket, export product, and workforce0infrastructural quality+ When more of a host’s
closest competitors have signed BITs, that country is much more likely to do so
itself+ The remarkable consistency across these three highly nuanced measures of
competitive space provides strong initial evidence of a tendency to match the pol-
icy choices of competitors+
Second, the size and character of markets for FDI have fed the competitive atmos-
phere in predictable ways+ The sheer size of the available pool of investment has
greatly raised countries’ stakes in securing a share+ More BITs are signed when
the global capital pool increases+ This ﬁnding is of course consistent with home
countries’ concern to protect their investors as well as hosts’ desire to increase
842 International Organizationtheir access+ But a second ﬁnding much more clearly indicates that the impetus
for signing is host-country driven+ Our theory of competition among hosts pre-
dicts more BITs where the market for FDI is most competitive—the manufactur-
ing sector+ We found, in contrast to what theories of obsolescing bargaining would
predict, that dependence on extractive industries reduced the probability that a host
would make such a commitment+
Finally, a theory of host-driven competition was supported by some of our ﬁnd-
ings about the qualities associated with those hosts most likely to sign+ We expected
BITs to be pursued most assiduously by host governments whose domestic institu-
tions render them least able to make credible commitments to protect property rights+
When we excluded the possibly confounded “law and order” variable from our analy-
sis, hosts were much more likely to sign if their regime was perceived as corrupt
by foreign investors+ They were also more likely to sign depending on the nature
of their legal institutions+ Common law countries—legal systems that some well-
documented empirical work has shown to be associated with better legal protec-
tion for property rights—are much less likely to sign than are civil law countries+
We recognize there are other reasons for common law countries to be reluctant to
enter into international treaty obligations generally, but it remains possible that the
differential ability of various legal traditions indigenously to protect property rights
is at work as well+ In this context, our ﬁnding on “law and order” is somewhat puz-
zling+ But we are far less convinced that this indicator captures the domestic insti-
tutional guarantees of protection and fairness that foreign direct investors seek+
The diffusion of norms that protect investment has been further advanced by
host governments’ desire to attract a share of the global capital pool+ We have
doubts that this phenomenon can be explained by the appeal of liberal ideas alone,
for we have witnessed the proliferation of BITs just as multilateral and customary
law approaches have foundered+ Most governments would prefer to avoid the
explicit commitments contained in these treaties; there continue to be few con-
cluded between the wealthiest countries of the world+ In some regions, developing
countries have tried to coordinate their responses to BITs in hopes of gaining more
favorable terms, with notably limited success+ In short, we base our conclusions
on the importance of competition for capital not just on statistical relationships
that show up in the quantitative analysis, but also on the broader context in which
our analysis is nested+
BITs are part of a larger process of globalization that has been furthered by the
dynamics of competition+ This competition is driven by the desire of developing
countries to participate in the global capitalist system+ But has this uncoordinated
strategy of signing away the sovereign right to regulate a growing segment of
national economic activity yielded the results developing countries have hoped
for? The evidence as to whether BITs actually succeed in attracting capital is unclear
on this point+ Our research suggests why this may be the case+ Competition for
capital has important redistributive consequences+ The result of the BIT competi-
tion may be only minimally improved access to capital at a high cost to national
sovereignty+
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 843Data Appendix: Summary Statistics and Sources for Variables Included in the Analysis
Variables Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Data
sources
Dependent variable bilateral investment treaty (survival rate)1 0+97 0+17 0 1 ~1!
Explanatory variables
Competition bits among export market competitors 2+79 3+72 0+00 36+57 ~1!, ~2!
bits among export product competitors 3+70 4+12 0+00 19+20 ~1!, ~3!
bits among infrastructure competitors 3+41 3+84 0+03 18+21 ~1!, ~3!
annual average net fdi inflows (% of gdp) 1+26 1+28 1+17 3+90 ~3!
host extractive industries/exports 0+23 0+28 0+00 1+00 ~3!
perceptions of host corruption 3+27 1+23 0+00 6+00 ~4!
host legal tradition (common law) 0+32 0+47 0+00 1+00 ~5!
Other diffusion bits among those with same religion 2+82 3+50 0+00 32+00 ~1!, ~7!, ~8!, ~9!
mechanisms bits among those with same language 3+12 3+54 0+00 43+25 ~1!, ~7!, ~8!, ~9!
bits among those with same colonizer 2+59 3+59 0+00 56+39 ~1!, ~7!, ~8!, ~9!
learning from success 0+15 0+22 0+59 0+17 ~1!, ~3!
coercion: host use of imf credits 0+74 0+41 0+00 1+00 ~3!
Host country controls host gdp (ln) 22+25 2+08 17+24 29+79 ~3!
host gdp/capita 2+21 4+70 0+00 52+71 ~3!
host gdp growth 3+89 5+54 61+59 85+90 ~3!
host net fdi inflows (% of gdp), t-11 +32 3+95 0+00 145+13 ~3!
host illiteracy rate 0+40 0+28 0+00 1+00 ~3!
host capital account/gdp 4+74 8+54 120+60 65+30 ~3!
host law and order 2+24 1+41 0+00 6+00 ~4!
host democracy 1+71 6+85 10+00 10+00 ~10!
host diplomatic representation 38+08 32+25 0+00 158+00 ~11!
host privatization record 0+18 0+80 0+00 14+80 ~12!
Home country controls home net fdi outflows (% of gdp) 0+31 1+60 26+06 14+65 ~3!
Dyadic controls dyadic trade (% of host’s gdp) 0+01 0+07 0+00 6+68 ~2!, ~3!
common colonial heritage 0+05 0+21 0+00 1+00 ~7!, ~8!, ~9!
common language 0+07 0+25 0+00 1+00 ~7!, ~8!, ~9!
alliance 0+05 0+22 0+00 1+00 ~13!
Common “shocks” cold war 0+72 0+45 0+00 1+00 —
number of bits globally, by year 4+47 5+14 0+00 17+72 ~1!
Sources: ~1! UNCTAD, available at ^http:00www+unctad+org0en0docs0poiteiiad2+en+pdf&; ~2! International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics; ~3! World Bank, World Development Indicators; available at
^http:00devdata+worldbank+org+ezp2+harvard+edu0dataonline0&; ~4! The PRS Group, available at ^http:00www+prsgroup+com0&; ~5! La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997 and 1998;
~6! Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski 1996; Political and Economic Database Codebook, available at ^http:00www+ssc+upenn+edu0;cheibub0data0ACLP_Codebook+PDF&; various country Web sites;
~7! Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 2000; ~8! Europa World Year Book 1999; ~9! Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook+ available at ^http:00www+odci+gov0cia0publications0
factbook0&; ~10! Polity IV, available at ^http:00www+cidcm+umd+edu0inscr0polity0&; ~11! Tagish Diplomatic Directory, available at ^http:00www2+tagish+co+uk0Links0embassy1b+nsf0&; ~12! Brune, Garrett, and
Kogut 2004; ~13! Correlates of War ~COW! Project, available at ^http:00cow2+la+psu+edu0&; Gibler and Sarkees 2004+
Note: 1+ Summary statistics for the dependent variable expressed as average survival rates ~rate of not signing a BIT!+
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